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Conspiracies and accusations are just that until they are confirmed. Correspondingly, 
those same conspiracies and accusations can only be confirmed with factual evidence. 
Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and Beyond thoroughly identifies, 
develops, and confirms many suspicions of signals intelligence operations, uses, methods, 
and regularity throughout the Cold War. The text itself is a compilation of individual 
academic works presented at an international conference held in Amsterdam in 
November 1999. As a result, each chapter is a fact-filled chronology of various national 
signals intelligence efforts of countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, United 
States, and in Scandinavia to name a few. 
The introduction makes a very earnest and successful effort to identify what signals 
intelligence is, how it evolved, and how it is used. If any advocates of HUMINT take the 
time to peruse the introduction, they will find it difficult to justify their trade as Aid and 
Wiebes, present many disturbing historical facts outlining appalling Allied losses during 
efforts to insert agents into enemy territory. (p. 5) A solid argument is made in favor of 
signals intelligence over human intelligence gathering. 
Several themes evolve throughout the compilation, including the nature of the close 
relationship between the United States and United Kingdom. An interesting component in 
this analysis is the examination of the circumstances on how this relationship came to be. 
Aside from the obvious relationship forged by the Allied war cause, certain 
disagreements in the Allied camp forced spontaneous divergences, sporadically 
undermining overall joint efforts. As an example, a particularly large rift developed 
between the US and UK over the UK decision to sell jet engine technology to the Soviet 
Union. (p. 108) 
The chapter on Canada's CSE (Communications Security Establishment) is quite 
informative as it outlines how the CSE has evolved to provide intercepted material for 
other purposes, such as trade negotiations, beyond traditional Cold War defence and 
security policy. What may be of particular interest to readers here is the exemplification 
of the forward looking nature of the CSE to a post- Cold War role. The chapter dealing 
with the American NSA (National Security Agency) is quite different in its approach as it 
presents a historical approach to NSA successes and failures throughout the Cold War. 
Special attention should be paid to key events which indicated a failure of the NSA's 
collection program. Particular reference is given to the beginning of the Korean War (p. 
39), U-2 overflights (p. 40), the Cuban Missile Crisis (p. 42), and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. (p. 47) However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is seen as a success in 
the eyes of the NSA, which provided the White House with a dismal three day advance 
warning. Nonetheless, the NSA chapter provides the reader with an excellent, fact-based 
chronology of NSA thinking and direction during the Cold War. 
Most readers are already aware that obtaining signals intelligence from the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War was a difficult endeavor. The fact that Eastern Europe acted as a 
massive land buffer between the West and the Soviet Union, placed the Scandinavian 
countries in a very favorable light in the eyes of the NSA. Due to the geography of 
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Scandinavian countries and the fact that 
signals intelligence is highly dependent on proximity to the transmission, a natural role 
evolved for the Nordic Countries. As such, the chapter dealing with Scandinavian 
SIGINT is a unique combination of geography, intelligence evolution, and Cold War 
tension, which is eloquently explained through an examination of technology, monetary 
compensation, and Cold War relations. 
Aid and Wiebes manage to condense the entire work into one central thesis in their 
conclusions: what were the important contributions made to the security of the United 
States, Canada, and various nations of Western Europe by SIGINT? While there is no 
single, all encompassing answer, the individual contributions are portrayed as a necessary 
instrument of foreign policy and Cold War diplomatic chess. 
On the whole, the book successfully answers the questions it raises. Due to the 
clandestine nature of intelligence, compilations that examine the operations of several 
countries are often difficult to research and write. What is perhaps somewhat misleading 
is the overall focus on Western intelligence services. There is no inclusion of Soviet 
SIGINT efforts, successes, or failures. In fact, the only reference to Soviet or Eastern 
European countries is as Western targets. A comparison between Western and Eastern 
SIGINT theory and practice would have greatly added to the success of this writing. In 
any event, as a text on Western signals intelligence creation, evolution, use, and 
continued practice, the book is an exceptional accomplishment. 
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